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7.1  Purpose 
 The most troubling problems in conservation – deforestation, land degradation, 
biodiversity loss, and climate change – are diffi cult to isolate and examine as inde-
pendent phenomena. Increasingly, the view from science casts these as outcomes 
from complex interactions within and between human society and its biophysical 
context. Reductionist science is poorly suited for representing such complexity, and 
that has given rise to multidisciplinary, multi-level systems approaches. This increase 
in multidisciplinary approaches has created a transformative wave of change as the 
existing institutions of conservation science absorb, adapt, and give way to innovations 
that can advance such approaches. 
 In this chapter, we examine how conservation science that focuses on the human 
individual – particularly the tradition of social science research that has emerged 
under the fl ag of “human dimensions of natural resources” – might fi t within a 
systems approach. Our examination of this topic has a dual purpose: to suggest 
the implications for (1) how ecosystem sciences can integrate the human individual 
into dynamic, multi-level models, and (2) how human dimensions research can 
envision the individual and direct new research initiatives in a broader social-
ecological context. 
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7.2  Impetus for Change Emanating from Ecological Sciences 
 Historically, biological traditions have set the direction of natural resources 
research and that is also the case in the drive toward multi-scale, multi-level and 
multi- disciplinary approaches. More specifi cally, this new direction in natural 
resources research is borne from the shift toward systems science in ecology. 
C. S. Holling ( 1998 ) described the ecosystems approach by contrasting two cultures 
in the ecological sciences. The traditional approach was reductionist, narrow and 
targeted, experimentally focused, concerned with Type I error, hypothesis testing 
and standard statistics. In this culture, the environment is viewed as largely fi xed 
and at a single scale, and causation is considered single and separable. The other 
fast- emerging culture was seen as broad, exploratory, multi-disciplinary and 
integrative, and it is focused on multiple lines of converging evidence. It uses non-
standard statistics and is concerned with Type II error. It takes a systems view of the 
environment, describing the environment’s dynamic qualities as self-organizing 
with multiple interactions, and operating at multiple scales. 
 This systems approach views nature as complex, dynamic, and adaptive. The system 
reveals both chaos and order, has continuous and discontinuous elements, and is 
marked by abrupt change (Holling et al.  2002 ). Hierarchy is central to this concep-
tualization. Phases of change are proposed to occur within multi-scale, multi-level 
structures that are nested within a broader hierarchy. The structures move at 
separate speeds and are multi-directional in their effects. Each level experiences its 
own change cycle, but slower and larger scales set conditions for faster, smaller ones, 
whereas the latter are the sites of variation that can generate functional shifts at 
higher scales. Systems are seen as having varying degrees of resilience – a reference 
to their ability to retain crucial functions during episodes of change. Adger et al. ( 2005 ) 
suggest that “the concept of resilience is a profound shift in traditional perspectives, 
which attempt to control changes in systems that are assumed to be stable, to a more 
realistic viewpoint aimed at sustaining and enhancing the capacity of social-ecological 
systems to adapt to uncertainty and surprise” (p. 1036). 
7.3  A Need for Greater Inclusion of the Individual 
in Ecosystem Models 
 Humans were largely absent from the early ecosystem models (e.g., Noss  1990 ), 
then were added as macro, driving forces that cause change in biological systems 
(e.g., Forester and Machlis  1996 ). But quickly, attention was given to integrating the 
social component in describing “social-ecological systems” (SES). Broad questions 
for the social aspects of resilience ask about human response and adaptation, 
how reorganization follows collapse or sudden dramatic change, and how social 
learning accumulates (Gunderson and Holling  2002 ). Political scientists, economists, 
geographers and anthropologists (Abel and Stepp  2003 ; Collins et al.  2011 ; Kok and 
Veldkamp  2011 ), working at the group or institutional level, have been quicker to 
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respond to this trend than were those focused on individuals in the social psychology 
tradition. Abel and Stepp ( 2003 ), for example, called for a new “ecosystems ecology 
in anthropology”, a discipline that has a long history of an ecological approach to 
cultural change. However, increasingly, the importance of including individuals in 
the internal dynamics of SES models has been recognized (Redman et al.  2004 ; 
Collins et al.  2011 ). Inclusion of the individual addresses an important weakness 
evident in SES modeling: representing the capacity of humans to make choices that 
affect the system. Davidson ( 2010 ) suggests that to be fully inclusive of a social 
component, concepts of resilience will need to account for the fact that, unlike other 
organisms in an ecological system, humans have the ability to postpone ecological 
effects, have unequal agency (due to power differentials) and the ability to imagine, 
anticipate, and invoke collective action. 
 While research on the individual predominates the published literature in the 
human dimensions of natural resources (HDNR) area (Manfredo et al.  2004 ), very 
little of this work fi ts readily into the SES paradigm. With few exceptions, most 
HDNR research is borne from the information processing paradigm made popular 
in psychology in the 1970s. This paradigm viewed psychological attributes as 
isolated, static, and enduring and did not account for the infl uence of factors 
such as culture or context on cognition (Gardner  1987 ). More recently, there have 
been explicit attempts to include individuals in SES models that have focused on 
fi nding simple social variables for use in techniques such as agent-based modeling 
(Janssen and Ostrom  2006 ; Buizer et al.  2011 ). Researchers have also proposed 
concepts or frameworks such as mental models (Jones et al.  2011 ), consumer 
preferences (Baumgärtner et al.  2011 ), and people-environment transactions 
(Stokols et al.  2013 ) as ways of representing individuals in SES. 
 Independent of these efforts, areas such as Cognitive Ecology, Evolutionary 
Psychology, Social-Ecological Psychology and Cross-Cultural Psychology have led 
the drive toward more complex, dynamic, adaptive multi-level approaches that might 
offer guidance in bringing individuals into SES models. Drawing from these areas, 
we make suggestions about three basic questions in developing approaches for 
bringing the individual into SES models: (1) is human thought conceptualized as a 
dynamic and adaptive process, (2) is the individual placed in a multi-level context, 
and (3) is human thought seen as mutually constructed with the social and natural 
environment. We address each of these questions throughout the remainder of 
this chapter. 
7.4  Human Thought as Dynamic and Adaptive 
 Growing threats such as climate change and desertifi cation have prompted concerns 
about the human ability to anticipate, adapt, and alter behavior to avoid undesirable 
results. Certainly, history shows that humans are remarkably adaptive. This adaptive 
success is attributed to our ability to create culture, accumulate knowledge and 
transmit that across generations. It is the cognitive processes of the human mind that 
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create outcomes such as technological advances, social collaboration, and institutional 
invention that generate effective adaptive success. The view from evolutionary 
psychology would propose that our cognitive systems and fundamental cognitions 
such as values are critical mechanisms for adapting to our social and ecological 
surroundings. Even a simple depiction of the dynamic and adaptive nature of 
thought processes, as we present here, can have meaningful implications for 
SES modeling. 
7.4.1  Dual Adaptive Systems in Humans 
 Theory suggests there are two separate systems that drive human thought and 
behavior (Evans and Stanovich  2013 ). System one evolved early in humans, and 
responses stemming from it tend to be automatic, fast and intuitive, and non- 
conscious. System two evolved more recently, and response is slow, requiring 
working memory and the deliberation of existing knowledge. The fi rst system is 
developed gradually over time through the process of associative learning, repeat 
experience, and trial and error. This system accumulates an individual’s learning 
into quick response mechanisms. Given the cumulative process, a single incident 
is unlikely to have a big effect on the responses of System one; further, the more 
incidents accumulated, the less likely change is to occur. As a consequence, a 
signifi cant amount of foundational associative learning occurs in one’s early years 
of life. System one gives a person instantaneous response to a constantly-changing 
surrounding. For a given motivational or goal state, this system shapes subconscious 
perception of the environment and its opportunities and dangers. It drives the automatic 
course of action in a fl uid and “online” manner. 
 System two is based on semantic or symbols-based learning, storage of information, 
recall and deliberation in new and novel ways. System two is used episodically as 
needed when a response situation rises to a conscious level. Information that is 
drawn from the environment and processed with information from memory to 
anticipate consequences of response can be stored for retrieval at a later time. 
System two processing is considered  slow in the sense that it requires considerable 
cognitive effort and time to reach a conclusion . While it is slow in that sense, it is 
 fast in its ability to change and adapt to new situations . For example, where a new 
incident is unlikely to affect System one processing, new information can readily 
change an attitudinal and behavioral response borne from System two. 
 System one is obviously not independent of System two. The foundational 
aspects of perception, assumptions, and evaluation shape our awareness, under-
standing, and acceptance of new information. Yet, the two systems are believed to 
sometimes act in confl ict with one another in diffi cult decision choices (e.g., when 
a person carefully analyzes pros and cons and has a gut feeling different from the 
result of that critical analysis). Evidence for the dual systems approach, and the 
confl ict between systems that may arise, is supported by studies that show different 
areas of the brain are active when different systems are engaged (Goel  2008 ). 
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 How can the dual systems view be useful in SES? These two systems paint 
a complex picture of human ability to adapt. On the one hand, System one facilitates 
continuity and predictability. It is the essence of cultural transmission by which 
customs, practices and meanings are carried through generations. System two 
prepares humans for abrupt and sudden changes in their surroundings. It allows 
people to quickly (relative to the effect of information on System one) assimilate 
information, weigh it against information stored in memory and develop a response 
to maximize positive outcomes. 
 A few examples reveal ways that the dual systems model brings perspectives to 
conservation problems. Recent articles have indicated that in order to attain social 
and ecological sustainability, human values and subsequent behavior must change 
(Burns  2012 ; Ehrlich and Kennedy  2005 ; Karp  1996 ; Vlek and Steg  2007 ). In some 
cases, initiatives have been undertaken to change human values. These initiatives 
will likely face an inordinate challenge, particularly with attempts at traditional 
rational appeal. As proposed by Kitayama and Uskul ( 2011 ), values are not entities 
but the “water we swim in”. They are learned through slow processes of associative 
learning and reinforced by more explicit, System two learning. Values arise gradually 
through the continued repetition of cultural practices, stories and myths, beliefs and 
meanings. They are not merely learned, but are “embrained”, or integrated within 
the mental processes controlled by the brain, and evidence is emerging that suggests 
there is a genetic basis for such culturally-delineated patterns. 
 Recent fi ndings exemplify how the long-term durability of values might affect 
conservation. Manfredo et al. ( 2013 ) provide data indicating that Americans’ 
wildlife value orientations can be traced to their ancestry, or country of origin, 
with shifts in thought patterns occurring slowly as states in the U.S. become more 
modernized. This view casts doubt on the ability to engineer an effect on cultural 
values and transfers attention to the key question of how values adapt (and at what 
rate) to a rapidly changing world. That is, when there is signifi cant interruption in 
surrounding life circumstances, such as warfare, massive environmental change or 
migration, how do values affect the adaptation process? 
 In another example, Weber ( 2006 ,  2010 ) explains that the slow acceptance of 
climate change may be related to the general lack of personal experience (climate 
events) that would inform the associative system of risk and produce negative 
evaluations or feelings such as fear that motivate action. In other words, System one’s 
intuitive infl uence contrasts with the deliberative process of System two on climate 
change response. Simply providing more facts will not change the situation. Research 
by Kahan et al. ( 2011 ) offers support for this explanation. Scientifi c literacy, according 
to their fi ndings, had minimal infl uence on perceptions of climate change in America, 
whereas cultural value effects were strong and guided people’s assessment of the 
credibility of climate change information (suggesting a strong System one infl uence). 
 A fi nal example comes from the study of traditional ecological knowledge 
(TEK), which encompasses empirical knowledge of natural resources, resource 
management systems, social institutions that guide management, and worldviews 
that provide meaning to the role of humans in ecosystems (Berkes  1999 ). TEK is far 
more than factual information learned cognitively (System two). It is also a 
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cumulative knowledge system transmitted across generations through associative 
learning and System one processes. An increasing body of evidence demonstrates that 
TEK is adapted by each generation and supplemented as new information becomes 
available through individual and group experiences with resource management 
(Berkes et al.  2000 ). In other words, TEK can be thought of as a cultural system and 
not merely as a body of cognitive information. 
 We conclude this section by proposing that whether or not the dual systems 
approach is applied, theoretical approaches and problem statements in SES research 
should emphasize the dynamic, adaptive nature of human thought. In doing so, 
research should explore alternative methods to the conventional interview or 
survey response methodology. This change will undoubtedly be challenging given 
that research sponsors often request traditional survey methods, HDNR researchers 
are trained primarily in these methods, and the availability of alternatives is 
somewhat limited. However, alternatives do exist, and recent examples illustrate 
the potential of experimental approaches (e.g., game theory), cognitive ability and 
styles tests, implicit attitude tests, longitudinal studies, and physiological and brain 
imaging measures. 
7.5  The Individual in a Multi-level Context 
 A systems approach to understanding the individual in SES views “the brain, body 
and world in coupled motion” (Hutchins  2010 , p. 709). Such an approach requires 
that the researcher reach across scales and infl uences in explaining human behavior. 
It requires the adoption of a broad, inclusive meta-theory but also implies non- 
traditional types of statistical methods (e.g., hierarchical linear modeling, social 
network analysis, agent-based modeling) and methodological concerns (e.g., the 
ecological fallacy). Hutchins ( 2010 ) has noted that applying systems approaches to 
understanding real-life behavior in psychology has been challenging. This is in no 
small part due to the complexity of humans and the near endless permutations of 
levels of effects. For those working in conservation, the hierarchy applied in research 
will depend on the way the problem is defi ned. Here we briefl y overview three 
broad hierarchical categories that will be useful to consider: within the individual, 
individual-group, and institutional and structural factors. 
7.5.1  Hierarchies Within the Individual 
 Humans are driven by a variety of interrelated processes, and each has a separate 
literature and breadth of theories including, for example, theories of needs and 
motivation, perception, cognition and evaluation, affect and emotion, and learning 
and memory. We understand just a fraction of how these processes operate together, 
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are formed and adapt people to their social-ecological surroundings. Hierarchical 
approaches would work toward bridging understanding of the interdependence of 
these processes and their impact on human judgments, decisions and behavior. 
 There is little current research in HDNR that takes a hierarchical approach, with 
one exception – the value-attitude-behavior hierarchy (VAB). VAB research brings 
together, in hierarchical form, the guiding infl uence of the more slowly-formed 
cognitive processes of values (System one) and the more rapid evaluative processes 
of attitudes (System two). There are a variety of examples of the VAB approach 
being used in the natural resources arena (e.g., Fulton et al.  1996 ; Vaske and 
Donnelly  1999 ; Hrubes et al.  2001 ; Oreg and Katz-Gerro  2006 ; Milfont et al.  2010 ). 
An important area for future research will likely explore the contexts in which 
behavioral response breaks from System one thought patterns (like values in the 
climate change example above) and information processing takes precedence in 
defi ning individual choice. 
 While VAB and other goal hierarchy approaches became popular in the 1980s, 
more recent advances reach across various sub-disciplines of psychology, joining 
self-report cognitive measures with genetic, biological, and physiological measures. 
The latter have been particularly useful in explaining dual systems models and 
also supporting evolutionary explanations of human behavior (Goel  2008 ). As an 
example of these advancements, Chiao and Blizinsky ( 2013 ) provided evidence of the 
linkage among social-ecological conditions (mental health and disease prevalence), 
human genetics (serotonin gene transporter), and cultural value types (individualist- 
collectivist). With data spanning across 29 nations, their research revealed that the 
Short allele of the 5-HTTLPR was more prevalent in collectivist cultures as an 
adaptive response to higher levels of disease prevalence. Collectivist cultures and 
associated customs not only support preventative behavior for disease spread, but 
they serve to provide social support that mediates the negative emotion and fear 
avoidance behavior associated with the Short allele 5-HTTLPR. 
 In another example, Greene et al. ( 2004 ) found evidence that personal moral 
decisions stimulate areas of the brain associated with emotion and social cognition 
(more primitive responses, available before language) while impersonal moral 
decisions are related to areas of the brain associated with in-depth processing. 
Considering its potential to inform future directions in HDNR research, to what 
extent might this fi nding be applied to understanding human-wildlife relationships, 
an area of focus within HDNR? More specifi cally, as an illustration, to what extent 
might these different decision paths be associated with mutualism versus domina-
tion wildlife value orientations identifi ed in the literature (see Manfredo et al.  2009 ; 
Teel and Manfredo  2010 )? Moral decisions would typically be those involving 
humans, but a key difference between those with a mutualism versus domination 
orientation is that the former views wildlife as family or companions, deserving of 
rights like humans, while the latter “de-personizes” wildlife. It would be reasonable 
to pursue the explanation that differences between the value orientation types on 
judgments about wildlife treatment are rooted in the two different cognitive systems 
examined by Greene et al. ( 2004 ). 
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7.5.2  The Individual-Group Hierarchy 
 Humans are driven strongly by social affi liation motives. That tendency has spawned 
high levels of cooperation and altruism among humans. As Fehr and Fischbacher 
( 2004 ) note, “human societies represent a spectacular outlier with respect to all 
other animal species because they are based on large-scale cooperation among 
genetically unrelated individuals” (p. 185). This tendency is seen to be, in part, an 
evolutionary response to being prey species for many predators in formative times 
(Hart and Sussman  2005 ), and it also posed adaptive advantages for evolving, 
competitive cultural groups (Boyd and Richerson  2009 ). 
 The human need to attach to groups is widely evident. People defi ne themselves 
through a hierarchy of identities – e.g., friendship groups, sports team groups, chat 
groups, professions and professional associations, governance groups (local, state, 
nation), being human, etc. The group itself can be considered an emergent property 
in systems terms, with characteristics and dynamics beyond the mere aggregation of 
individuals. The process of attaining group membership is elemental in forming our 
social world. The processes and effects of group membership are explained through 
Social Identity (SIT) and Self-Categorization (SCE) theories which Spears ( 2011 ) 
claims are “possibly as close as we come in contemporary social psychology to a 
grand theory” (p. 208). A social group exists when people share a defi nition of who 
they are, how they relate and how they are different from those not in the group. 
People have many different group identities, and these identities vary in how 
important they might be to a person and how accessible they are in a given situation. 
Once a social identity is accessed in a given situation, it is important because it 
shapes one’s social perception of a situation, appropriate social conduct and one’s 
own self- defi nition. This is a dynamic process, however, because as the situation 
changes, so might the salience of the identity. For example, a representative of the 
coal industry and a representative of the environmental community, while in a public 
debate about global warming, may take on highly adversarial and oppositional 
identities; yet, in other contexts they may defi ne themselves as members of the same 
group (e.g., mothers, alumni of the same university, Americans, fans of a given 
team, etc.). The salience of a given identity is seen as dependent on the situational 
context as well as a person’s commitment to the identity. The more salient and 
committed a person is to an identity, the more likely that person will act out and seek 
the identity role (Stryker and Serpe  1982 ). 
 The process of self-categorization into a group offers explanation of how social 
identity affects the thoughts and behavior of the individual. As a member of the 
group, and contingent on one’s commitment and emotional attachment to the group, 
one will learn or infer the appropriate norms, attributes, and attitudes associated 
with that group. Norms, which are beliefs about how one ought to behave or think, 
are a critical aspect of group maintenance. Norms represent ideal or prototypical 
thoughts or behaviors that unify and ensure compliance and agreement within the 
group (Turner  1991 ). As a group member, the person adopts those norms or attitudes 
in situations where their group identity is salient. Theorists have coined this as 
“depersonalizing” – a process whereby a person acts in accordance with group 
norms and perceives oneself as representing the group, not as an individual. 
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 The use of SIT and SCE in understanding environmental topics has been 
relatively neglected (Twigger-Ross et al.  2003 ), and yet the available applications 
offer promise in considering how these frameworks may be integrated into HDNR 
studies on individual-group dynamics in the future. For example, Bonaiuto et al. ( 1996 ) 
showed that perceptions of beach pollution among samples of youth in six separate 
resort towns were associated with the person’s attachment to either the town or the 
nation (Great Britain). SIT was borne from an interest in understanding confl ict 
among groups of people, and Stoll-Kleemann ( 2004 ) illustrates such a use. The theory 
was applied in this case to address intergroup confl ict among farmers, conservationists 
and forest managers in biodiversity management in Germany’s protected areas. 
In another application, Carpenter and Cardenas ( 2011 ) explored the relevance of 
social identity in common pool resource experimentation. They found that when 
students were placed in an experimental context where they knew they were 
engaged in a cross-cultural “game” situation (i.e., their national social identity was 
made salient), participants were more likely to represent the country group proto-
type position: U.S. students were more likely to emphasize conservation strategies 
in allocating forest resources, while Columbian students tended to emphasize 
resource extraction. 
 In a multi-level application, Burton and Wilson ( 2006 ) provided an analysis of 
the shift in Western farming regimes from productivist (focused on maximizing 
food production) to post-productivist (focused on consumption and sustainability) 
and multi-functional (both productivist and post-productivist, separated spatially 
and temporally) regimes. While structural variables (i.e., policy, political economy) 
would suggest the transition is occurring, the identities that farmers reported did not 
suggest such a transition at the individual level (i.e., individual farmers sustained an 
emphasis on production). 
 SIT and SCE have also been applied in understanding prejudice, conformity, 
crowding behavior, organizational behavior, leadership deviance and group cohe-
siveness, all of which are important topics in HDNR (Hogg  2006 ). There is strong 
potential for a dynamic model of individual-group involvement in researching 
conservation topics. The research methodology might involve more intense in-person 
assessments (e.g., groups, situational salience, group norms and attitudes) across 
actors and times. Such assessments could serve as the basis for examining the 
relative infl uence of group versus independent action on key policy and behavioral 
outcomes and how groups, individuals, and the environment interact and change 
in that process. 
7.5.3  Institutional and Structural Factors 
 How do human psychological processes interact with various elements of context 
such as modes of economy, technological capabilities, power differentials, demo-
graphic trends, political structures and ecological conditions? While these questions 
have received attention since the earliest efforts of the social sciences, they have 
become mainstream to psychology in only the past couple of decades (Triandis  2007 ). 
Here we review just a few of the categories that have received attention in the literature. 
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7.5.3.1  Economic Development 
 Economic development has historically been a central focus of social science 
theory. It is particularly strong as a result of the infl uence of Marx who had a broad 
and lasting infl uence across the social sciences, especially in sociology and political 
science. A contemporary articulation of his modernization theory is found in Post- 
materialism theory, as introduced by Inglehart ( 1997 ), who focuses on modern-day 
(post World War II) global cultural change. Inglehart’s theory proposes that increases 
in modernization (wealth, education, and urbanization) reduce the prevalence of 
subsistence needs among citizens of a nation. As subsistence needs decline, needs 
for affi liation and self-esteem become more prominent, and as needs change, so do 
people’s values. Materialist values, emphasizing a concern for basic physical and 
economic security, are replaced by self-expressive (also referred to as post- materialist) 
values, and in the realm of religion, traditional values are replaced by secular values. 
This shift in values is proposed to have important implications for many areas of 
social life (Pippa and Inglehart  2004 ; Inglehart and Welzel  2005 ). For example, 
when materialist values pre-dominate, individuals are more willing to subordinate 
their own preference for the greater good, but with self-expressive values, individuals 
tend to pursue their own preference and an active voice in government. This, Inglehart 
contends, produces a trend toward participatory decision-making and away from 
hierarchical authority. 
 Post-materialism theory has been used to address environmental topics in two 
areas. The fi rst was to provide an explanation for the growth of environmentalism. 
Inglehart initially proposed that the rise of pro-environmental attitudes was associ-
ated with the shift toward post-materialist values: as countries became modernized 
and less concerned about meeting basic needs, citizens would become more 
concerned about the environment. Findings from his own data, however, showed a 
preponderance of pro-environmental attitudes in developing countries (Brechin and 
Kempton  1994 ), prompting Inglehart ( 1995 ) to suggest that environmentalism 
will arise: (1) in situations where there are “objective conditions” of increased 
environmental degradation, but also (2) due to “subjective conditions” of cultural 
shift, in countries of increasing modernization. This issue continues to be explored in 
a multi-level context with an interest in understanding the cause of both in-country 
differences and intra-individual differences in explaining the growth of environ-
mentalism. Findings generally support the chain of events in which an increase in 
economic well-being brings about a shift toward post-materialist values, and that 
shift in turn yields a rise in pro-environmental attitudes (Gelissen  2007 ; Franzen and 
Meyer  2010 ; Haller and Hadler  2008 ). 
 A second conservation-related application of Post-materialism theory is found in 
research by Manfredo et al. ( 2009 ). These researchers proposed that the changing 
context of social life has led to a shift from domination to mutualism value orienta-
tions toward wildlife in the U.S. While domination prioritizes human well-being 
over wildlife and promotes treatment of wildlife in utilitarian terms, mutualism 
views wildlife as capable of relationships of trust with humans and is defi ned by a 
desire for companionship with wildlife. This theoretical perspective argued that 
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the reduced reliance on wildlife for material goods, the human tendency toward 
anthropomorphizing and a growing need for affi liation in post-materialist society 
have fueled the trend toward mutualism wildlife value orientations. This shift, in 
turn, has had an important impact on people’s relationships with wildlife and their 
attitudes toward wildlife policy-related issues. A multi-level study in 19 western 
U.S. states revealed a strong contextual effect of modernization variables – i.e., 
individual differences in wildlife value orientation scoring could be explained by 
state-level infl uences of urbanization, income, and education. Higher levels of these 
state-level predictors were also associated with higher percentages of mutualists in 
a state. Moreover, those with a mutualism versus domination orientation were less 
likely to favor traditional wildlife management techniques (e.g., lethal control) and 
participate in recreational hunting, revealing the connection between wildlife value 
orientations and wildlife-related attitudes and behaviors (Manfredo et al.  2009 ). 
7.5.3.2  Governance Systems 
 Over the past two decades, a growing body of work has centered around questions 
of governance in SES research, recognizing the importance of institutional mecha-
nisms in infl uencing system dynamics and resilience (Gerlak  2013 ; Anderies et al. 
 2004 ; Walker et al.  2004 ). Broadly, governance can be defi ned in this context as 
creating the conditions for collective action and ordered rule as well as the set of 
formal and informal rules that constitute the social system’s institutions (Walker 
et al.  2006 ). More specifi cally, environmental governance, defi ned as the “set of 
regulatory processes, mechanisms and organizations through which political actors 
infl uence environmental actions and outcomes” (Lemos and Agrawal  2006 , p. 298), 
has received increasing attention in the literature. 
 An area ripe for research considering the role of the individual is refl ected in the 
move toward new approaches to environmental governance, including adaptive 
governance or adaptive co-management which relies on collaborative networks 
that connect individuals, organizations, and institutions at multiple levels for 
managing ecosystems (Dietz et al.  2003 ; Folke et al.  2003 ; Olsson et al.  2004 ). 
These approaches build upon the extensive tradition of research on community-based 
governance of common-pool resources advanced by Ostrom ( 1990 ,  1997 ,  2007a ) 
and others (e.g., see Agrawal  2002 ; Schlager  2004 ) and are refl ective of the rise 
in more participatory, decentralized forms of decision-making, or collaborative 
governance (Ansell and Gash  2007 ; Rogers and Weber  2010 ). 
 Using a series of case studies from Sweden and Canada, Olsson et al. ( 2004 ) 
point out how individual actors and their characteristics, including leadership and 
trust-building capabilities as well as cultural values and local ecological knowledge, 
are often a critical component of the self-organizing process that defi nes adaptive 
co-management systems. They go on to demonstrate the potential of such systems 
for building resilience by enhancing community capacity to deal with uncertainty 
and change. The individual characteristics they identifi ed have also been described 
as important elements of social capital, a term widely used across the social 
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sciences to represent the collective capacity of individuals in social networks 
(Walker et al.  2006 ; Ostrom and Ahn  2003 ; Pretty  2003 ). According to Ostrom and 
Ahn ( 2009 ), social capital can be viewed as “an attribute of individuals and of their 
relationships that enhance their ability to solve collective-action problems” (p. 20). 
 In addition to social capital and related elements such as leadership, a host of 
other factors designed to connect individual and group-level characteristics to 
governance regimes were identifi ed in a recent SES framework advanced by 
Ostrom ( 2007b ). Under the category of resource “user” variables, Ostrom included, 
for example, individuals’ knowledge or mental models of the SES, their dependence 
on the resource and history of use, and socioeconomic characteristics. Recognizing 
concerns over recommended panaceas or blueprint approaches to the governance of 
complex social-ecological problems, the framework was intended to serve as a 
diagnostic tool for analysis by detailing an array of variables posited by prior research 
and theory (including a review by Agrawal [ 2001 ]) to impact patterns of SES 
interactions and outcomes. While Ostrom cautioned that not all variables would be 
relevant in every study, demanding an assessment of which variables and at what 
levels would be relevant in terms of their potential impact on human behavior 
and SES outcomes, the framework was proposed by the author as “a step toward 
building a strong interdisciplinary science of complex, multilevel systems” that 
would facilitate future research to match governance strategies to particular problems 
in the SES context (Ostrom  2007b , p. 15181). 
 Emerging work in this area shows the potential for establishing stronger linkages 
between environmental governance and the psychological characteristics of individuals 
within a given social structure. For example, Newig and Fritsch ( 2009 ) conducted a 
meta-analysis of 47 case studies to assess the effectiveness of participatory, multi-level 
forms of governance. While polycentric governance (consisting of multiple centers 
of decision-making authority) was correlated with environmental outcomes, the 
environmental preferences of individuals (averaged across all participants) had by far 
the strongest effect. In another example, Paciotti et al. ( 2005 ) examined the linkage 
between collaborative personality styles and the adoption of social justice institutions 
in comparing the Sukuma and Pimbwe ethnic groups in Tanzania. Game theory 
methods showed a much stronger sharing tendency in the Sukuma compared to the 
Pimbwe. This fi nding was true in situations of within-group and between ethnic 
group games. Sharing and trust served as a foundation for the Sukuma institutional 
form of justice called Sungusungu. The Pimbwe’s attempt to adopt this form of 
governance was simply not successful due to their lack of cooperative style. The 
researchers suggested that the alignment of personality characteristics and governance 
styles serves to adapt social groups to their surroundings. 
 Arguably, as indicated by these examples, psychological research could contribute 
to further addressing certain individual-level variables and interactions that Ostrom 
( 2007b ) and others have identifi ed as well as aid in expanding the list of individual 
characteristics (including measures of psychological constructs such as values, 
attitudes, etc.) worth considering in the governance, and broader SES context. 
In addition, inclusion of governance considerations in HDNR research would 
expand understanding of the broader institutional and structural factors that can 
infl uence individual thought and behavior. 
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7.5.3.3  Geographic Regions 
 Geographic variation on psychological attributes has long been an interest in the 
social sciences (Allik and McCrae  2004 ; Hofstede and McCrae  2004 ; Rentfrow 
et al.  2008 ). There has been a strong focus on national differences, but differences 
have also been identifi ed at regional levels (Nisbett  1993 ; Kitayama et al.  2006 ; 
Rentfrow et al.  2008 ). Attributes found to vary have included personality character-
istics, cultural values, and emotional expression. As an illustration, Rentfrow et al. 
( 2008 ) revealed how the “Big 5” personality characteristics varied considerably at 
the state level across the U.S. Further, state-level personality correlated strongly 
with other social quality variables such as crime rate, social involvement, and 
religiosity (all increased with levels of extraversion). 
 While the geographic differences found in such studies are interesting, the real 
value of their fi ndings is the provocation to explain, or theorize, why these differ-
ences exist. For example, Rentfrow et al. ( 2008 ) proposed that the explanation for 
geographic variation in their study was tied to “founder migration” – non-random 
groups of people with distinct attributes and perhaps genetic make-up settling in an 
area. The characteristics in a region are perpetuated through selective migrations 
(people moving to the area) and social and environmental infl uences. Similarly, 
Nisbett ( 1993 ; Nisbett and Cohen  1996 ) suggested geographic differences in 
white male violence could be attributed to cultural factors associated with historical 
patterns of economy and migration. Kitayama et al. ( 2006 ) also relied on a similar 
cultural mechanism to explain regional differences when comparing “frontier” 
settlement areas with other areas across nations, but Kitayam and Uskul ( 2011 ) 
went on to argue that cross-cultural psychological and behavioral differences are 
the result of complex interactions among different systems that make up human 
individuals (genes, brains, minds) and collectives (social networks, cultures, 
broader environments). As these examples reveal, understanding geographic differ-
ences in psychological attributes will require holistic theorizing and multi-level 
approaches that recognize the complexity of the human context. Recent advances 
integrating culture in psychological research, discussed in more detail below, offer 
promise in informing new directions in this area (Oishi et al.  2009 ; Kitayama and 
Cohen  2007 ). 
7.5.3.4  Cultural Groups 
 Cross-cultural psychology emerged in the 1960s and 1970s, and as recently as 1998 
Segall et al. ( 1998 ) proclaimed “psychology in general has long ignored ‘culture’ as 
a source of infl uence on human behavior and still takes little account of theories or 
data from other than Euro-American cultures” (p. 1102). Yet, cross-cultural 
psychology has given fresh insight into the pursuit of identifying human universals, 
considered one of the primary goals of psychology (Jahoda and Krewer  1997 ). 
Interestingly, the growing body of cross-cultural research has found that many of 
the central theories of psychology, which originated from research in North America, 
have not generalized well to other cultures (Norenzayan and Heine  2005 ). 
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 But the contrasting goal of psychology, understanding diversity, has been well 
served by cross-cultural psychology, and the logic for such diversity coincides with 
the main goal of an SES approach – determining the adaptive interrelationships of 
humans and their environments. As Triandis ( 2007 ) states:
 [people]…determine ways of organizing information, symbols, evaluations, and patterns of 
behavior; intellectual, moral, and aesthetic standards; knowledge, religion, and social 
patterns…systems of government, systems of making war; and expectations and ideas 
about correct behavior that are more or less effective [functional] in adapting to their 
ecosystem. (p. 64) 
 Further, the methods and theory of cross-cultural psychology can be key to 
informing SES approaches to conservation issues that include individuals and 
account for their varied cultural backgrounds. 
 One area of research in cross-cultural psychology that has received enduring 
attention is the diversity of cultural values and understanding why they exist (e.g., 
Hofstede  2001 ; Schwartz  2006 ). This research has been guided by practical 
concerns of improving intergroup relations, increasing success in global markets, 
and international diplomacy. A frequent focus in this area has been on the documented 
difference between the collectivist values of Southeast Asian cultures and the 
individualistic values of cultures of Europe and North America (Triandis  1995 ). 
Two recent studies illustrate the social-ecological nature of the explanation for this 
difference, highlighting the relevance of cross-cultural psychology in an SES 
context as well as the potential for this sub-discipline to inform future directions 
in HDNR research aimed at understanding the broader infl uences on individual 
thought/behavior. Kitayama et al. ( 2010 ) proposed a production-adoption model of 
cultural change which they used to explain the strong individualistic and indepen-
dence “ethos” in the U.S. They argued that novel values and practices arise within 
a social group to cope with major adaptive challenges for biological, economic, 
and/or political survival, whereas adoption of existing practices is motivated by a 
desire to achieve prestige and higher status within one’s community. In the U.S., 
values and practices associated with independence and self-reliance emerged as 
settlers moved West and had to adapt to sparsely-populated, harsh environmental 
conditions. Given the economic success of Westward expansion, residents in the 
Eastern U.S. imitated these values in achieving higher social status and prestige. 
 In another recent example, Gelfand et al. ( 2011 ) proposed exploring the 
collective- independent difference through a cultural systems model of “tightness- 
looseness” that links ecological threats, social processes (norms and tolerances of 
deviant behavior), socio-political institutions, and psychological processes. Overall, 
based on empirical fi ndings with data from 33 nations, they suggested that as 
ecological and human threats increase, the need for strong norms and punishment 
of deviant behavior also increases because these mechanisms facilitate social 
coordination in response to the threats. Such coordination enhances the chance of 
survival. Given that institutions are a refl ection of norms and tolerances, societies 
with strong norms (“tight” nations) would have more restricted press, more laws, 
criminal justice systems with higher monitoring and severe punishment, and 
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stronger religion, while “loose” nations would be the opposite. Also, in tight cultures, 
there is a higher degree of structure and constraint in day-to-day situations as well 
as individual- level psychological adaptations like self-regulation and self-monitoring. 
7.6  Mutually Constructed Nature of Human Thought 
and the Social and Natural Environment 
 Implicit in this question is the assumption that the structure and organization of 
individual thought serves to adapt humans to their social-ecological surroundings. 
This assumption has been an emphasis since the origins of psychology and, more 
recently, a particular focus of evolutionary psychology. Schwartz ( 2006 ) proposed, 
for example, that value orientations serve to guide people in a cultural group in how 
to maintain the individual-group relationship, how to act to preserve the social fabric, 
and how to manage relationships with the natural world. As another illustration, 
Fredrickson and Branigan ( 2001 ) argued that while negative emotions have served 
to support basic survival, positive emotions are believed to have fostered explora-
tion, expansion and pioneering among humans. A fi nal example is research by 
Uskul et al. ( 2008 ) who showed different ecological niches occupied by humans 
affect economic activities, which, in turn, produce different cognitive styles that 
help adapt human activities to the niche. 
 What is generally missing in this literature is the feedback effect that human 
adaptation has on the environment, an essential aspect of SES modeling. The criticism 
that ecology has not looked at the reciprocal effects of humans and the environment 
can be applied equally to the social sciences. This is one of the critical challenges for 
the future recognized by Oishi and Graham ( 2010 ) who introduce “socio-ecological 
psychology”, which would examine “how mind and behavior are shaped in part by 
their natural and social habitats and  how natural and social habitats are in turn 
shaped partly by mind and behavior [emphasis added]” (p. 356). 
 A better understanding of reciprocal effects will be diffi cult to obtain without 
research taking on an expanded time frame that might be achieved by: (1) the inte-
gration of ethnographic and historical perspectives with traditional social psycho-
logical approaches (e.g., Haggerty and Travis  2006 ), and/or (2) the increased use of 
longitudinal research (e.g., Boone and Galvin, Chap.  9 , this volume). A classic 
example of the former is Rappaport’s ( 1968 )  Pigs for the Ancestors: Ritual in the 
Ecology of a New Guinea People . Rappaport based the book on his ethnographic 
work with the Tsembaga, a group of Maring speakers living in the highlands of 
Australian New Guinea (now Papua New Guinea). He presented a systems approach 
that proposed beliefs about religion and the resultant rituals served as the regulatory 
mechanism creating a homeostasis among the Tsembaga, other human groups, and 
the environment. The rituals served to maintain biotic communities, limit warfare 
among groups, provide a basis for establishing allies, and distribute protein (from a 
ritual involving the widespread slaughter of pig populations) throughout the local 
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population at the time of greatest need. While Rappaport’s work was criticized on a 
number of counts, the simplicity and elegance of his account led to it becoming a 
classic. It provided a compelling story of humans in a social-ecological system with 
ideology serving a central, adaptive role. 
 At present, there is little emphasis on the dynamic interplay of human thought 
and the social-ecological context. Far more abundant when it comes to research on 
the social aspects of SES is literature that: (1) is normative, with an emphasis on 
ways to increase collaborative approaches to governance; (2) includes individual- 
level variables that give token representations of human infl uences in a system; and 
(3) consists of broad-based conceptual and structural models that depict broad 
categories of individual-level variables and feedbacks, with sparse articulation of 
specifi c effects. More uncommon, but emerging, are approaches that predict how 
people will behave when given new information or a particular set of circumstances, 
which in turn creates a myriad of social, policy and ecological outcomes (see Boone 
and Gavin, Chap.  9 , this volume; Fischer et al.  2013 ). Approaches to SES that 
adequately represent the mutual construction of society, individuals, and the 
environment are arguably one of the most important goals for the future. 
7.7  Conclusion 
 The ultimate purpose of an SES approach is to inform questions about human 
resilience and adaptation in the face of environmental change. Humans’ remarkable 
success in adaptation to date is linked to cognitive abilities of innovation, social 
learning, and combining different sources of information into new understandings of 
the world (Cosmides and Tooby  2002 ; Boyd et al.  2011 ). Is there some way that we 
can understand and direct that innovation toward effective mitigation? The emergence 
and adoption of social innovation is a topic of new and growing interest among 
conservation researchers, particularly in response to climate change (Nicholls and 
Murdock  2012 ; Rodima-Taylor et al.  2012 ). Yet, it is also a topic that has received 
considerable attention in organizational sciences over the past four decades, where 
it is generally believed that innovation is necessary for long-term organizational 
success (Hage  1999 ; Willis and Mastrofski  2011 ). Meta-analyses in this area 
suggest that in team situations, innovation is related to process variables such 
as support for innovation, vision, task orientation, and external communication 
(Hülsheger et al.  2009 ). In another analysis of innovation in work situations, 
Hammond et al. ( 2011 ) found a complex mix of factors produced innovation, 
including individual factors, characteristics of the job, and environmental factors. 
Other literature reviews have found inconsistent and inconclusive results among the 
many empirical studies (Wolfe  1994 ; Anderson et al.  2004 ). Anderson et al. ( 2004 ) 
concluded that: (1) future research should look at innovation processes as cyclical, 
longitudinal, and iterative; and (2) context and a multi-level approach (individual-
group- organization-culture) are critical for exploring this topic. Interestingly, this 
proposal converges on the conclusion that broadly-generalizable panaceas for 
complex social-ecological problems are simply not forthcoming (Ostrom  2007b ). 
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It leads us to conclude that an understanding of adaptation and innovation in SES 
should attend to the considerations we raise here: the dynamic aspects of human 
thought, the importance of individuals’ involvement with and attachment to groups, 
and the infl uence of a broad array of social and ecological contextual variables. 
 We began this chapter by suggesting that a more complete inclusion of individuals 
in SES models has implications for both ecosystem science and HDNR researchers. 
The role of humans in the conceptual approaches of ecosystem science has moved 
through phases of increasing integration over the past three decades. Initially, 
humans were viewed as external to ecosystems; then humans were seen as drivers of 
impacts to ecosystems. More recently, humans have been cast as active agents that 
impact and respond to ecosystems that are in constant shift. We are just beginning to 
move toward a fully integrative view that humans are participants in a co- constructed, 
co-evolving, dynamic system. The complexity of social systems is in need of more 
attention in SES models which will remain poorly specifi ed until there is a represen-
tation of the multi-level context of human individuals. We support the view that 
individuals occupy a unique and central role here – they are the primary unit of 
evolutionary succession; and causal processes, both up and down scales, must 
circulate through them (Schank  2001 ). In other words, change at other social levels 
aggregated upward, such as cultural evolution, institutional change, technological 
advances, innovation, etc., all must occur in the minds and actions of individuals. 
 Ecosystem science sees the system as hierarchies nested within broader hierar-
chies, each operating at different speeds and cycles of change. For those in HDNR, 
we propose that such an approach works well for examining individuals in their 
social-ecological context. We propose a view of the psychological attributes of the 
individual as dynamic, in a multi-level context, and mutually constructed with 
society and environment. 
 We conclude by reinforcing the importance of understanding the role of human 
individuals in the complex social-ecological interactions that produce daunting global 
environmental challenges such as climate change, land degradation, and loss of 
biodiversity. The impacts of humans on ecosystems are registered one behavior and 
one individual at a time. But each behavior exists in a somewhat patterned tapestry 
of behavioral choices across many individuals, across time and space. A better 
understanding of human behavior in its broader tapestry is important if our science is 
to effectively inform decisions that infl uence resilience to growing environmental stress. 
 Open Access This chapter is distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution 
Noncommercial License, which permits any noncommercial use, distribution, and reproduction in any 
medium, provided the original author(s) and source are credited. 
 References 
 Abel, T., & Stepp, J. R. (2003). A new ecosystems ecology for anthropology.  Conservation 
Ecology, 7 (3), 12. 
 Adger, W. N., Hughes, T. P., Folke, C., Carpenter, S. R., & Rockström, J. (2005). Social-ecological 
resilience to coastal disasters.  Science, 309 , 1036–1039. 
7 Considerations in Representing Human Individuals in Social-Ecological Models
154
 Agrawal, A. (2001). Common property institutions and sustainable governance of resources. 
 World Development, 29 , 1649–1672. 
 Agrawal, A. (2002). Common resources and institutional sustainability. In E. Ostrom, T. Dietz, 
N. Dolsak, P. C. Stern, S. Sonich, & E. U. Weber (Eds.),  The drama of the commons 
(pp. 41–86). Washington, DC: National Academy Press. 
 Allik, J., & McCrae, R. R. (2004). Toward a geography of personality traits: Patterns of profi les 
across 36 cultures.  Journal of Cross-Cultural Psychology, 35 , 13–28. 
 Anderies, J. M., Janssen, M. A., & Ostrom, E. (2004). A framework to analyze the robustness of 
social-ecological systems from an institutional perspective.  Ecology and Society, 9 (1), 8. 
 Anderson, N., De Dreu, C. K. W., & Nijstad, B. A. (2004). The routinization of innovation 
research: a constructively critical review of the state-of-the-science.  Journal of Organizational 
Behavior, 25 , 147–173. 
 Ansell, C., & Gash, A. (2007). Collaborative governance in theory and practice.  Journal of Public 
Administration Research and Theory, 18 (4), 543–571. 
 Baumgärtner, S., Derissen, S., Quaas, M. F., & Strunz, S. (2011). Consumer preferences determine 
resilience of ecological-economic systems.  Ecology and Society, 16 (4), 9. 
 Berkes, F. (1999).  Sacred ecology: Traditional ecological knowledge and resource management . 
Philadelphia: Taylor & Francis. 
 Berkes, F., Colding, J., & Folke, C. (2000). Rediscovery of traditional ecological knowledge as 
adaptive management.  Ecological Applications, 10 , 1251–1262. 
 Bonaiuto, M., Breakwell, G. M., & Cano, I. (1996). Identity processes and environmental threat: 
The effects of nationalism and local identity upon perception of beach pollution.  Journal of 
Community and Applied Social Psychology, 6 , 157–175. 
 Boyd, R., & Richerson, P. J. (2009). Culture and the evolution of human cooperation.  Philosophical 
Transactions of the Royal Society B: Biological Sciences, 364 , 3281–3288. 
 Boyd, R., Richerson, P. J., & Henrich, J. (2011). The cultural niche: Why social learning is essential 
for human adaptation.  Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, 108 , 10918–10925. 
 Brechin, S., & Kempton, W. (1994). Global environmentalism: A challenge to the postmaterialism 
thesis?  Social Science Quarterly, 75 , 245–269. 
 Buizer, M., Arts, B., & Kok, K. (2011). Governance, scale, and the environment: The importance 
of recognizing knowledge claims in transdisciplinary arenas.  Ecology and Society, 16 , 1. 
 Burns, T. R. (2012). The sustainability revolution: A societal paradigm shift.  Sustainability, 
4 , 1118–1134. 
 Burton, R. J. F., & Wilson, G. A. (2006). Injecting social psychology theory into conceptuali-
sations of agricultural agency: Towards a post-productivist farmer self-identity?  Journal of 
Rural Studies, 22 (1), 95–115. 
 Carpenter, J., & Cardenas, J. C. (2011). An inter-cultural examination of cooperation in the 
commons.  Journal of Confl ict Resolution, 55 (4), 632–651. 
 Chiao, J. Y., & Blizinsky, K. D. (2013). Population disparities in mental health: Insights from 
cultural neuroscience.  American Journal of Public Health . doi: 10.2105/AJPH.2013.301440 . 
 Collins, S., et al. (2011). An integrated conceptual framework for long-term social-ecological 
research.  Frontiers in Ecology and the Environment, 9 (6), 351–357. 
 Cosmides, L., & Tooby, J. (2002). Unraveling the enigma of human intelligence: Evolutionary 
psychology and the multimodular mind. In R. J. Sternberg & J. C. Kaufman (Eds.),  The evolu-
tion of intelligence (pp. 145–198). Mahwah: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates. 
 Davidson, D. J. (2010). The applicability of the concept of resilience to social systems: Some 
sources of optimism and nagging doubts.  Society and Natural Resources, 23 , 1135–1149. 
 Dietz, T., Ostrom, E., & Stern, P. (2003). The struggle to govern the commons.  Science, 302 , 
1907–1912. 
 Ehrlich, P. R., & Kennedy, D. (2005). Millennium assessment of human behavior.  Science, 309 (22), 
562–563. 
 Evans, J. S. B. T., & Stanovich, K. E. (2013). Dual-process theories of higher cognition: Advancing 
the debate.  Perspectives of Psychological Science, 8 (3), 223–241. 
 Fehr, E., & Fischbacher, U. (2004). Social norms and human cooperation.  Trends in Cognitive 
Sciences, 8 (4), 185–190. 
M.J. Manfredo et al.
155
 Fischer, A. P., Korejwa, A., Kock, J., Spies, T., Olsen, C., White, E., & Jacobs, D. (2013). Using 
the forest, people, fi re agent-based social network model to investigate interactions in social- 
ecological systems.  Practicing Anthropology, 35 (1), 8–13. 
 Folke, C., Colding, J., & Berkes, F. (2003). Synthesis: Building resilience and adaptive capacity in 
social-ecological systems. In F. Berkes, J. Colding, & C. Folke (Eds.),  Navigating social- 
ecological systems: Building resilience for complexity and change (pp. 352–387). Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press. 
 Forester, D. J., & Machlis, G. E. (1996). Modeling human factors that affect the loss of biodiversity. 
 Conservation Biology, 10 (4), 1253–1263. 
 Franzen, A., & Meyer, R. (2010). Environmental attitudes in cross-national perspective: A multi- 
level analysis of the ISSP 1993 and 2000.  European Sociological Review, 26 (2), 219–234. 
 Fredrickson, B. L., & Branigan, C. (2001). Positive emotions. In T. J. Mayne & G. A. Bonanno (Eds.), 
 Emotions: Current issues and future directions (pp. 123–151). New York: Guilford Press. 
 Fulton, D. C., Manfredo, M. J., & Lipscomb, J. (1996). Wildlife value orientations: A conceptual 
and measurement approach.  Human Dimensions of Wildlife, 1 (2), 24–47. 
 Gardner, H. (1987).  The mind’s new science: A history of the cognitive revolution . New York: 
Basic Books. 
 Gelfand, M. J., et al. (2011). Differences between tight and loose cultures: A 33-nation study. 
 Science, 332 , 1100–1104. 
 Gelissen, J. (2007). Explaining popular support for environmental protection: A multilevel analysis 
of 50 nations.  Environment and Behavior, 39 , 392–415. 
 Gerlak, A. K. (2013). Policy interactions in human-landscape systems.  Environmental Management . 
doi: 10.1007/s00267-013-0068-y . 
 Goel, V. (2008). Anatomy of deductive reasoning.  Trends in Cognitive Sciences, 11 , 435–441. 
 Greene, J. D., Nystrom, L. E., Engell, A. D., Darley, J. M., & Cohen, J. D. (2004). The neural bases 
of cognitive confl ict and control in moral judgment.  Neuron, 44 (2), 389–400. 
 Gunderson, L. H., & Holling, C. S. (Eds.). (2002).  Panarchy: Understanding transformations in 
human and natural systems . Washington, DC: Island Press. 
 Hage, J. T. (1999). Organizational innovation and organizational change.  Annual Review of 
Sociology, 25 , 597–622. 
 Haggerty, J. H., & Travis, W. R. (2006). Out of administrative control: Absentee owners, resident 
elk and the shifting nature of wildlife management in southwestern Montana.  Geoforum, 
37 , 816–830. 
 Haller, M., & Hadler, M. (2008). Dispositions to act in favor of the environment: Fatalism and 
readiness to make sacrifi ces in a cross-national perspective.  Sociological Forum, 23 (2), 281–311. 
 Hammond, M. H., Neff, N. L., Farr, J. L., Schwall, A. R., & Zhao, X. (2011). Predictors of 
individual- level innovation at work: A meta-analysis.  Psychology of Aesthetics, Creativity, and 
the Arts, 5 , 90–104. 
 Hart, D., & Sussman, R. W. (2005).  Man the hunted: Primates, predators, and human evolution . 
Boulder: Westview Press. 
 Hofstede, G. (2001).  Culture’s consequences: Comparing values, behaviors, institutions and 
organizations across nations . Thousand Oaks: Sage. 
 Hofstede, G., & McCrae, R. R. (2004). Personality and culture revisited: Linking traits and dimen-
sions of culture.  Cross-Cultural Research, 38 , 52–88. 
 Hogg, M. A. (2006). Social identity theory. In P. J. Burke (Ed.),  Contemporary social psychological 
theories (pp. 111–136). Palo Alto: Stanford University Press. 
 Holling, C. S. (1998). Two cultures of ecology.  Conservation Ecology, 2 (2), 4. 
 Holling, C. S., Gunderson, L. H., & Ludwig, D. (2002). In quest of a theory of adaptive change. 
In L. H. Gunderson & C. S. Holling (Eds.),  Panarchy: Understanding transformations in 
human and natural systems (pp. 3–22). Washington, DC: Island Press. 
 Hrubes, D., Ajzen, I., & Daigle, J. (2001). Predicting hunting intentions and behavior: An applica-
tion of the theory of planned behavior.  Leisure Sciences, 23 , 165–178. 
 Hülsheger, U. R., Anderson, N., & Salgado, J. F. (2009). Team-level predictors of innovation at 
work: A comprehensive meta-analysis spanning three decades of research.  Journal of Applied 
Psychology, 94 (5), 1128–1145. 
7 Considerations in Representing Human Individuals in Social-Ecological Models
156
 Hutchins, E. (2010). Cognitive ecology.  Topics in Cognitive Science, 2 (4), 705–715. 
 Inglehart, R. (1995). Public support for environmental protection: Objective problems and 
subjective values in 43 societies.  PS: Political Science and Politics, 28 (1), 57–72. 
 Inglehart, R. (1997).  Modernization and postmodernization . Princeton: Princeton University Press. 
 Inglehart, R., & Welzel, C. (2005).  Modernization, cultural change and democracy: The human 
development sequence . Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
 Jahoda, G., & Krewer, B. (1997). History of cross-cultural and cultural psychology. In J. W. Berry, 
Y. H. Poortinga, & J. Pandey (Eds.),  Handbook of cross-cultural psychology: Theory and 
method (Vol. 1, pp. 1–42). Boston: Allyn & Bacon. 
 Janssen, M. A., & Ostrom, E. (2006). Empirically based, agent-based models.  Ecology and Society, 
11 (2), 37. 
 Jones, N. A., Ross, H., Lynam, T., Perez, P., & Leitch, A. (2011). Mental models: An interdisciplinary 
synthesis of theory and methods.  Ecology and Society, 16 (1), 46. 
 Kahan, D. M., Wittlin, M., Peters, E., Slovic, P., Ouellette, L. L., Braman, D., & Mandel, G. N. 
(2011).  The tragedy of the risk-perception commons: Culture confl ict, rationality confl ict and 
climate change (Temple University Legal Studies Research Paper No. 2011-26; Cultural 
Cognition Project Working Paper No. 89; Yale Law & Economics Research Paper No. 435; 
Yale Law School, Public Law Working Paper No. 230).  http://ssrn.com/abstract=1871503 . 
Accessed 30 Aug 2013. 
 Karp, D. A. (1996). Values and their effect on pro-environmental behavior.  Environment and 
Behavior, 28 (1), 111–133. 
 Kitayama, S., & Cohen, D. (2007).  Handbook of cultural psychology . New York: Guilford. 
 Kitayama, S., & Uskul, A. K. (2011). Culture, mind, and the brain: Current evidence and future 
directions.  Annual Review of Psychology, 62 , 419–449. 
 Kitayama, S., Ishii, K., Imada, T., Takemura, K., & Ramaswamy, J. (2006). Voluntary settlement 
and the spirit of independence: Evidence from Japan’s “northern frontier”.  Journal of 
Personality and Social Psychology, 91 (3), 369–384. 
 Kitayama, S., Conway, L. G., III, Pietromonaco, P. R., Park, H., & Plaut, V. C. (2010). Ethos of 
independence across regions in the United States: The production–adoption model of cultural 
change.  American Psychologist, 65 (6), 559–574. 
 Kok, K., & Veldkamp, T. (2011). Scale and governance: Conceptual considerations and practical 
implications.  Ecology and Society, 16 (2), 23. 
 Lemos, M. C., & Agrawal, A. (2006). Environmental governance.  Annual Review of Environment 
and Resources, 31 , 297–325. 
 Manfredo, M. J., Teel, T. L., & Bright, A. D. (2004). Application of the concepts of values and 
attitudes in human dimensions of natural resources research. In M. J. Manfredo, J. J. Vaske, 
B. L. Bruyere, D. R. Field, & P. J. Brown (Eds.),  Society and natural resources: A summary of 
knowledge (pp. 271–282). Jefferson: Modern Litho. 
 Manfredo, M. J., Teel, T. L., & Henry, K. L. (2009). Linking society and environment: A multi- 
level model of shifting wildlife value orientations in the western U.S.  Social Science Quarterly, 
90 (2), 407–427. 
 Manfredo, M. J., Dietsch, A., & Teel, T. L. (2013).  A dynamic view of environmental values: 
Tracing the trajectory of value orientations toward wildlife. Unpublished draft manuscript, 
Department of Human Dimensions of Natural Resources, Colorado State University, Fort 
Collins. 
 Milfont, T. L., Duckitt, J., & Wagner, C. (2010). A cross-cultural test of the value-attitude-behavior 
hierarchy.  Journal of Applied Social Psychology, 40 (11), 2791–2813. 
 Newig, J., & Fritsch, O. (2009). Environmental governance: Participatory, multi-level – and 
effective?  Environmental Policy and Governance, 19 (3), 197–214. 
 Nicholls, A., & Murdock, A. (Eds.). (2012).  Social innovation: Blurring boundaries to reconfi gure 
markets . New York: Palgrave Macmillan. 
 Nisbett, R. E. (1993). Violence and U.S. regional culture.  American Psychologist, 48 , 441–449. 
M.J. Manfredo et al.
157
 Nisbett, R. E., & Cohen, D. (1996).  Culture of honor: The psychology of violence in the south . 
Boulder: Westview. 
 Norenzayan, A., & Heine, S. J. (2005). Psychological universals: What are they and how can we 
know?  Psychological Bulletin, 131 (5), 763–784. 
 Noss, R. F. (1990). Indicators for monitoring biodiversity: A hierarchical approach.  Conservation 
Biology, 4 (4), 355–364. 
 Oishi, S., & Graham, J. (2010). Social ecology : Lost and found in psychological science. 
 Perspectives on Psychological Science, 5 (4), 356–377. 
 Oishi, S., Keseber, S., & Snyder, B. H. (2009). Sociology: A lost connection in social psychology. 
 Personality and Social Psychology Review, 13 , 334–353. 
 Olsson, P., Folke, C., & Berkes, F. (2004). Adaptive comanagement for building resilience in 
social-ecological systems.  Environmental Management, 34 (1), 75–90. 
 Oreg, S., & Katz-Gerro, T. (2006). Predicting proenvironmental behavior cross-nationally: Values, 
the theory of planned behavior, and value-belief-norm theory.  Environment and Behavior, 
38 , 462–483. 
 Ostrom, E. (1990).  Governing the commons: The evolution of institutions for collective action . 
New York: Cambridge University Press. 
 Ostrom, E. (1997). Institutional rational choice: An assessment of the institutional analysis and 
development framework. In P. A. Sabatier (Ed.),  Theories of the policy process (pp. 21–64). 
Boulder: Westview Press. 
 Ostrom, E. (2007a). A general framework for analyzing sustainability of social-ecological 
systems.  Science, 325 , 419–422. 
 Ostrom, E. (2007b). A diagnostic approach for going beyond panaceas.  Proceedings of the 
National Academy of Sciences, 104 (39), 15181–15187. 
 Ostrom, E., & Ahn, T. K. (Eds.). (2003).  Foundations of social capital . Cheltenham: Edward Elgar. 
 Ostrom, E., & Ahn, T. K. (2009). The meaning of social capital and its link to collective action. 
In G. T. Svendsen & G. L. H. Svendsen (Eds.),  The handbook of social capital: The troika of 
sociology, political science and economics (pp. 17–35). Northampton: Edward Elgar. 
 Paciotti, B., Hadley, C., Holmes, C., & Mulder, M. B. (2005). Grass-roots justice in Tanzania. 
 American Scientist, 93 , 58–65. 
 Pippa, N., & Inglehart, R. (2004).  Sacred and secular: Religion and politics worldwide . Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press. 
 Pretty, J. (2003). Social capital and the collective management of resources.  Science, 302 , 1912–1914. 
 Rappaport, R. A. (1968).  Pigs for the ancestors: Ritual in the ecology of a New Guinea people . 
New Haven: Yale University Press. 
 Redman, C. L., Grove, J. M., & Kuby, L. H. (2004). Integrating social science into the long-term 
ecological research (LTER) network: Social dimensions of ecological change and ecological 
dimensions of social change.  Ecosystems, 7 (2), 161–171. 
 Rentfrow, P. J., Gosling, S. D., & Potter, J. (2008). A theory of the emergence, persistence, and 
expression of geographic variation in psychological characteristics.  Perspectives on 
Psychological Science, 3 (5), 339–369. 
 Rodima-Taylor, D., Olwig, M. F., & Chhetn, N. (2012). Adaption as innovation, innovation as 
adaptation: An institutional approach to climate change.  Applied Geography, 33 , 107–111. 
 Rogers, E., & Weber, E. (2010). Thinking harder about outcomes for collaborative governance 
arrangements.  American Review of Public Administration, 40 (5), 546–567. 
 Schank, J. C. (2001). Beyond reductionism: Refocusing on the individual with individual-based 
modeling: Computer-simulated surrogates in modeling.  Complexity, 6 (3), 33–40. 
 Schlager, E. (2004). Common-pool resource theory. In R. F. Durant, D. J. Fiorino, & R. O’Leary 
(Eds.),  Environmental governance reconsidered: Challenges, choices, and opportunities 
(pp. 145–176). Cambridge: MIT Press. 
 Schwartz, S. H. (2006). A theory of cultural value orientations: Explication and applications. 
 Comparative Sociology, 5 , 136–182. 
7 Considerations in Representing Human Individuals in Social-Ecological Models
158
 Segall, M. H., Lonner, W. J., & Berry, J. W. (1998). Cross-cultural psychology as a scholarly 
discipline: On the fl owering of culture in behavioral research.  American Psychologist, 
53 (10), 1102–1110. 
 Spears, R. (2011). Group identities: The social identity perspective. In S. J. Schwartz, K. Luyckx, & 
V. L. Vignoles (Eds.),  Handbook of identity theory and research (Vol. 1, pp. 201–224). 
New York: Springer. 
 Stokols, D., Lejano, R. P., & Hipp, J. (2013). Enhancing the resilience of human-environment 
systems: A social-ecological perspective.  Ecology and Society, 18 (1), 7. 
 Stoll-Kleemann, S. (2004). The social-psychological dimension of biodiversity conservation. 
In S. S. Light (Ed.),  The role of biodiversity conservation in the transition to rural sustainability 
(pp. 147–159). Amsterdam: Ios Press. 
 Stryker, S., & Serpe, R. T. (1982). Commitment, identity salience, and role behavior: Theory and 
research example. In W. Ickes & E. S. Knowles (Eds.),  Personality, roles, and social behavior 
(pp. 199–218). New York: Springer. 
 Teel, T. L., & Manfredo, M. J. (2010). Understanding the diversity of public interests in wildlife 
conservation.  Conservation Biology, 24 (1), 128–139. 
 Triandis, H. C. (1995).  Individualism and collectivism . Boulder: Westview. 
 Triandis, H. C. (2007). Culture and psychology: A history of the study of their relationship. 
In S. Kitayama & D. Cohen (Eds.),  Handbook of cultural psychology (pp. 59–76). New York: 
Guilford Press. 
 Turner, J. C. (1991).  Social infl uence: Mapping social psychology series . Belmont: Thompson 
Brooks/Cole Publishing. 
 Twigger-Ross, C., Bonaiuto, M., & Breakwell, G. (2003). Identity theories and environmental 
psychology. In M. Bonnes, T. Lee, & M. Bonaiuto (Eds.),  Psychological theories for environ-
mental issues (pp. 203–233). Burlington: Ashgate. 
 Uskul, A. K., Kitayama, S., & Nisbett, R. E. (2008). Ecocultural basis of cognition: Farmers and 
fi shermen are more holistic than herders.  Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, 
105 (25), 8552–8556. 
 Vaske, J. J., & Donnelly, M. P. (1999). A value-attitude-behavior model predicting wildland 
preservation voting intentions.  Society and Natural Resources, 12 , 523–537. 
 Vlek, C., & Steg, L. (2007). Human behavior and environmental sustainability: Problems, driving 
forces, and research topics.  Journal of Social Issues, 63 (1), 1–19. 
 Walker, B., Holling, C. S., Carpenter, S. R., & Kinzig, A. (2004). Resilience, adaptability and 
transformability in social-ecological systems.  Ecology and Society, 9 (2), 5. 
 Walker, B., Gunderson, L., Kinzig, A., Folke, C., Carpenter, S., & Schultz, L. (2006). A handful of 
heuristics and some propositions for understanding resilience in social-ecological systems. 
 Ecology and Society, 11 (1), 13–27. 
 Weber, E. U. (2006). Experience-based and description-based perceptions of long-term risk: 
Why global warming does not scare us (yet).  Climatic Change, 77 , 103–120. 
 Weber, E. U. (2010). What shapes perceptions of climate change?  Wiley Interdisciplinary Reviews: 
Climate Change, 1 (3), 332–342. 
 Willis, J. J., & Mastrofski, S. D. (2011). Innovations in policing: Meanings, structures, and 
processes.  Annual Review of Law and Social Science, 7 , 309–334. 
 Wolfe, R. (1994). Organizational innovation: Review, critique, and suggested research directions. 
 Journal of Management Studies, 31 , 405–431. 
M.J. Manfredo et al.
